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NOTES
PUBLIC TELEVISION AND THE GOVERNMENT'S
PERPETUATION OF A BIPARTITE SYSTEM-
THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
PARTIES
All political ideas cannot and should not be channeled into the
programs of our two major parties. History has amply proved
the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups,
who innumerable times have been in the vanguard of demo-
cratic thought and whose programs were ultimately ac-
cepted.... The absence of such voices would be a symptom of
grave illness in our society.
-- Chief Justice Warren'
I. INTRODUCTION
During political elections, any restraint on speech can pose a serious
threat to our basic guarantees of freedom of expression and democratic
government under the United States Constitution.' Even more detrimen-
tal to the American public would be a limitation on access to the mass
media because of the media's significant effect on the outcome of elec-
tions.3 In fact, the mass communications media increasingly have be-
1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957). See also Alan Raphael, Com-
ment, Keeping Third Parties Minor Political Party Access to Broadcartin& 12 IND. L. Rv.
713 (1979) ("Third parties... have raised new issues many of which have been adopted later
by the major parties and have become enshrined in law.").
2. See. eg. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[There is] a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."); Raphael, supra note 1, at 716
("Wide exposure [to divergent political views] leads to an informed electorate, upon which the
proper functioning of a democracy rests."). See also infra notes 138-40 and accompanying
text.
3. Raphael, supra note 1, at 721 ("Today, television is the major source of public infor-
mation about most issues and candidates."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
MiONAL LAW 808 n.16 (2d ed. 1988) ('The increased frequency of government
communication, coupled with expanding use of sophisticated mass media technologies to en-
hance the effectiveness of government messages, makes it likely that government can affect
public opinion on a wide variety of issues."); Arnold P. Lutzker, Campaigns on the Air: Polit-
ical Broadcast Litigation, 6 Lrro. 36 (1980) ("Politics is synonymous with the media. In an
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come a prominent ingredient of effective campaigning.4 Television, in
particular, has become a primary source of candidate exposure and a
means to heavily influence voters.5 Television has the capacity to "focus
public attention,"' , set the public agenda7 and impact voters' perceptions
of candidates.8 Additionally, television creates candidates' public
images9 and promotes a candidate's name awareness more effectively
than does the print media.10
Because of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and television's
enormous power to inform and shape public opinion, the broadcast in-
dustry represents both significant opportunities and hazards for free ex-
pression. 1 When a television station is publicly owned as an
instrumentality of the government, the government has the potential to
control political ideas. Additionally, the government has the ability to
increase the likelihood of election of particular candidates and the parties
they represent. This can lead to the perpetuation of certain governmen-
tal beliefs and interests. Thus, defining the limits of the government's
power to restrict the speech of candidates for political office is of compel-
ling urgency and importance; such manipulation of the electoral process
and prescription of program content may constitute a direct infringement
of a candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.12
In Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission1 3
("Chandler"), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a public
television station may exclude third party candidates 4 from broadcast
political debates.' 5 The court thereby reversed an injunction barring
Georgia Public Television ("GPTV") from excluding Libertarian candi-
age of technological revolutions, television is the most forceful, direct, passionate medium of
expression.").
4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
5. James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A
Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHi. L. Rrv. 892, 927-28 (1984).
6. Id at 928 n.189.
7. Id
8. IM
9. Id
10. Gardner, supra note 5, at 928 n.189.
11. Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12. See, eg., WALTER GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIOHrs 41 (1960) ("Governmentally im-
posed constrictions of thought and conscience are obviously inconsistent with popular control
of the government. And since thinking without communication is profitless, freedom of ex-
pression must be protected in order to make freedom of thought a reality.")
13. 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
14. "Third party," "minor party" and "minority party" are used interchangeably through-
out this note.
15. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489.
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dates from debates between Democrats and Republicans in a Georgia
gubernatorial contest. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that its decision
allowing GPTV to exclude the Libertarians from the debates did not vio-
late the Libertarians' First Amendment rights because it was a matter of
editorial discretion. 6 The court explained that although its decision was
content-based, 7 it was not made in an effort to suppress the views of the
minor party candidates.18
This note will demonstrate that the appellate court's decision in fact
constituted a viewpoint-based restriction, and therefore, violated the
First Amendment. 9 It will further establish that even if the decision was
not viewpoint discrimination, the ruling constituted an unjustified con-
tent-based regulation.2" This note will then illustrate that the Chandler
court, in ruling that third party candidates can be excluded from tele-
vised debates, failed to consider the underlying policies of the First
Amendment. Consequently, the court's holding was contrary to these
fundamental national values.2 ' Finally, this note will argue that govern-
ment-controlled public television stations have an obligation to air the
views of all ballot-qualified candidates for public office in order to pre-
vent government monopoly over the election process.22
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW-THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S
PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides in unequivocal
and unqualified language that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ....23
Expression has been granted more immunity from government regu-
lation than most other forms of human conduct. Yet, that extensive im-
munity is not absolute.24 For example, the United States Supreme Court
has held that restraints on free expression may be "permitted for appro-
16. Id. at 488-89.
17. A content-based restriction is a restraint put on communication because of the
message conveyed. Generally, the government cannot restrict speech based on its message
unless it can demonstrate a compelling justification for such a regulation. See infra notes 26-34
and accompanying text.
18. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489.
19. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 124-55 and accompanying text.
22. See infra part VI.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
24. See, eg., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("(lt is well under-
stood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.").
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priate reasons ' ' and that abridging the right to freedom of speech re-
quires interpretation.26
Central to an analysis of the First Amendment's protection of free-
dom of expression is the determination of the type of speech being sup-
pressed. The Supreme Court has generally grouped restraints on free
expression into two broad classifications: content-based restrictions and
content-neutral restrictions. 27 Content-based restrictions are prohibi-
tions placed on communication because of the message conveyed.2 8 By
contrast, content-neutral restrictions restrict communication without re-
gard to the message conveyed or its communicative impact.29 These re-
strictions reduce the flow of communication by limiting the activities
through which such communication may be conveyed.3"
Generally, "government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."3 In applying
content-based restrictions, however, the Court distinguishes between
"high" and "low" value expression.3 2 For example, advocacy of immi-
nent lawless behavior, false statements of fact, commercial speech, and
obscenity have been accorded "low" First Amendment value and have
traditionally been considered unprotected or only marginally protected
speech."3 Courts subject unprotected and marginally protected speech to
a lower level of scrutiny and, therefore, most restrictions on these types
25. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
26. See, eg., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360 (infringement of First Amendment interests does not
end the court's inquiry, because "the prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment pro-
tections is not an absolute").
27. See eg., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1024 (2d ed. 1991);
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 789-92; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
28. STONE, supra note 27, at 1024.
29. Id
30. TRIBE, supra note 3, at 789-90.
31. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
32. STONE, supra note 27, at 1024.
33. See, eg., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky the
Supreme Court explained:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional prob-
lem. These include ... the insulting or 'fighting' words-those by which their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
It at 571-72 (footnote omitted). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."); Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("The Constitution... accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.")
(citation omitted); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("[O]bscene material is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment.").
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of speech are upheld.34
In contrast, a court must strictly scrutinize all other content-based
regulations. In such cases, there is a strong presumption that the regula-
tion is unconstitutional, and the government has the burden of showing
"that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."" Additionally, the gov-
ernment may not tell persons what they can or cannot say.36 It has an
obligation to remain neutral in its regulation of protected communica-
tion. Hence, viewpoint discrimination is "censorship in its purest
form," 3 and thq government can never regulate content solely to sup-
press the particular viewpoint a speaker espouses.38
When the regulation is content-neutral, the court's analysis depends
on whether the expression takes place in a public forum, semi-public fo-
rum or nonpublic forum.39 If expression occurs in a public forum, an
individual's right to free speech is deemed to be substantially impor-
tant.4° Thus, any regulation which is imposed on the time, place and
34. See, ag., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (defendant's conviction
for calling the city marshall a "goddamned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" upheld; his
words would likely provoke the average person to retaliate); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 762 (1982) (state may ban the distribution of materials showing children engaged in sex-
ual conduct, even though the material is not legally obscene; First Amendment value of al-
lowing children to be photographed in such acts is "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis").
35. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 362-63 (1976) ("It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment
rights must survive exacting scrutiny.... The interest advanced must be paramount, ... [t]he
gain to the subordinating interest... must outweigh the incurred loss of protected rights, and
the government must 'employ] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment.. .' ")
(citations omitted)); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
36. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976).
37. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983).
38. Id. See also Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In its opinion
regarding the propriety of imposing viewpoint-based restrictions upon expression, the Court
explained:
A remark attributed to Voltaire characterizes our zealous adherence to the principle
that the government may not tell the citizen what he may or may not say. Referring
to a suggestion that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be legitimate, be said: 'I
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.' The
essence of that comment has been repeated time after time in our decisions invalidat-
ing attempts by the government to impose selective controls upon the dissemination
of ideas.
Id at 63.
39. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985);
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 986-87.
40. See, eg., Perry Edu," Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
See also Milwaukee County v. Carter, 45 N.W.2d 90, 93 (1950). The Wisconsin Court, in
invalidating legislation that prohibited the use of public parks for religious and political ad-
dresses, stated:
Government may, in the interests of public order, safety, and the equitable sharing of
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manner of expression must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest and provide adequate, alternative channels for
communication. 41 Examples of public forums include public areas such
as streets, sidewalks, parks and public facilities created for the primary
purpose of communication.4 2
A limited or semi-public forum is public property the state has
opened up to public communicative activity.4 3 As long as the state re-
tains the open nature of this type of property, it is bound by the same
standards that apply in a traditional public forum." Some government-
owned property, such as schools and libraries, fall into this category.45
When speech transpires in a nonpublic forum, the government has
the greatest ability to regulate speech activities. Regulation of expression
is acceptable so long as it is reasonable.4 6 The government need only
show that restrictions on speech are rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.47 It should be noted, however, that just as the gov-
ernment cannot establish content-based regulations founded upon a
person's viewpoint, 45 the government cannot regulate speech in a manner
designed to suppress an individual's point of view. This type of regula-
tion would be unconstitutional in any of the three forums.4 9
facilities, exercise reasonable control over when, where and under what conditions
public meetings may be held on public property; but to deny to the people all use of
the people's property for the public discussion of specified subjects is an unconstitu-
tional interference of rights expressly guaranteed by both state and federal
constitutions.
41. See, eg., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Perry Educ. Assn,
460 U.S. at 45.
42. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290 (1983); Ward, 491 U.S. at 790-91.
43. See, e.g., Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
44. Id. at 45-46. See also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for public forum
standards and examples.
45. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966).
46. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 37.
47. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); United States v. Kokinda,
110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119-20 (1990); Perry Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
48. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
49. See e.g., Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (1 1th Cir. 1989). "The existence of reason-
able grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum ... will not save a regulation that is in
reality a facade for viewpoint-based discrimination." Id at 1324 (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985)).
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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Statement of the Case: Chandler v. Georgia Public
Telecommunications Commission
Walker Chandler, the Libertarian candidate for lieutenant-governor
of Georgia, and intervenor Carole Ann Rand, the Libertarian candidate
for governor, requested to be included in a pre-election political debate
for their respective offices."0 These debates were to be broadcast by
Georgia Public Television ("GPTV") on November 2, 1990, and Novem-
ber 4, 1990, respectively."1 GPTV is the broadcasting facility of the
Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission ("GPTC") and an in-
strumentality of the State of Georgia. 2 GPTC denied the Libertarian
candidates' requests to participate in the debates, which included only
the Democratic and Republican candidates.5 3 Their requests were de-
nied even though both candidates were ballot-qualified 4 and GPTC
would not have been unduly burdened by extending the debate one half-
hour to accommodate the additional participants."5 Instead, GPTC only
offered each of the Libertarians one-half hour of television time to state
their views, separate from the debates.5 6
Chandler and Rand sued GPTC and its directors and officers in an
effort to enjoin the public television broadcaster from airing political de-
bates between the Democratic and Republican candidates without in-
cluding the Libertarians."' A federal district court issued a temporary
restraining order, requiring GPTC to include the two Libertarian candi-
dates in the televised debates. 58 On appeal, 9 the Court of Appeals for
50. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 487-88 (11 th
Cir. 1990).
51. Id at 488.
52. See Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 749 F. Supp. 264, 265
(N.D. Ga. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-1(a) (Michie 1991).
53. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 490.
54. Id at 490. Georgia law provides that any political body that is duly registered is
qualified to nominate candidates for state-wide public office by convention if "[a]t the preced-
ing general election, the political body nominated a candidate for state-wide office and such
candidate received a number of votes equal to 1 percent of the total number of registered voters
who were registered and eligible to vote in such general election." GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-
180(2) (Michie 1991).
There were 2,941,339 registered voters in Georgia in 1988. Therefore, a Libertarian can-
didate had to receive a minimum of 29,414 votes in a statewide election held that year in order
to be considered ballot-qualified. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 490 n.2.
55. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 269.
56. Id
57. Id at 265.
58. Id at 270.
59. The Atlanta Journal and the Atlanta Constitution, the parties responsible for paying
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the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.6'
B. The District Court's Decision: First Amendment Violated
The Chandler district court held that the decision by the directors of
GPTC to deny the ballot-qualified Libertarian gubernatorial candidates
the opportunity to participate in the televised debates violated the candi-
dates' First Amendment rights. 6' In its analysis, the court distinguished
between a traditional public forum and a nonpublic forum. It explained
that in a traditional public forum, speakers can be excluded only when
the restriction is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.
62
In a nonpublic forum, however, only a reasonable basis is needed to re-
strict access.63 The district court decided that its analysis did not depend
upon a determination of the nature of the relevant forum because the
defendants failed to articulate even a reasonable basis for excluding the
Libertarians."
The court pointed out that GPTC's executive director stated that
the Commission chose to include only the two "frontrunners" in each
debate because their information was of greater interest to the public,
and hence, more newsworthy.6 The court conceded that in comparison
to the Democrats and Republicans, the Libertarian platform was less
popular and represented a minority view in Georgia.6 6 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that excluding the views of Chandler and Rand because
they were less interesting or less newsworthy was viewpoint-based dis-
the cost of the stage set-up for the gubernatorial debate, intervened to pursue an appeal. Chan-
dler, 917 F.2d at 488 n.2.
60. I at 490.
61. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 749 F. Supp. 264, 269
(1990).
The court also found that the exclusion of the Libertarian candidates was a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Id In its analysis, the court explained
that third party candidates are not a protected class for equal protection purposes. Thus, a
minimal scrutiny standard of analysis, giving deference to state objectives, was required. How-
ever, a state must exhibit "some rationality in the nature of the class singled out." 1d. (citing
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966)). The court could not find any rational or
legitimate public purpose for excluding the minor party candidates. It noted that both Chan-
dler and Rand, along with the Democratic and Republican candidates, were ballot-qualified;
the fact that Chandler and Rand were from a less popular party did not constitute a rational
basis for their exclusion. The court also stated that the GPTC's actions violated the Equal
Protection Clause for many of the same reasons the First Amendment had been violated. Id.
62. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 267. See also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
63. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 267. See also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
64. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 267.
65. Id at 268.
66. Id
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crimination in violation of the First Amendment.6' Further, the court
found the regulation constituted a "constitutionally impermissible prior
restraint based on content."6 Consequently, the district court found
that the two Libertarian candidates had satisfied the requirements to sus-
tain a motion for a temporary restraining order,69 and enjoined GPTC
from airing the debates unless Chandler and Rand were also included. 0
IV. THE REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. The Court of Appeals' Per Curiam Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that GPTC's actions
did not violate the First Amendment," and remanded the district court's
order with instructions to dismiss the complaint.7 2 The Eleventh Circuit
explained that the amount of control a public broadcast licensee can ex-
ercise over its programming consistent with the First Amendment "de-
pends on the mission of the communicative activity being controlled.1
73
In Chandler, the court found that GPTC, as a public television station,
had an obligation to serve the public interest.7 4 The court noted that
GPTC was designed to provide educational and instructional services to
the citizens of Georgia,75 and therefore, was not a medium open to all
who have a message to convey.76 Thus, the state could regulate the con-
67. Id
68. Id.
69. To prevail on a motion for a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must establish the
following: (I) a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) a substan-
tial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) the
threatened harm to the plaintiff outweighs the possible harm to the defendants should they be
enjoined; and (4) the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest. Chandler 749
F. Supp. at 269-70 (citing United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1459 n.10 (11th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987)).
70. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 270.
71. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 488-89 (1 1th
Cir. 1990). The court also held that GPTC's actions did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It explained that the candidates were not members of a
protected class, and thus, the appellants only needed to exhibit a rational basis for their deci-
sion. It pointed out that, as demonstrated previously in reference to the First Amendment
issue, the appellants' decisions were rational, and hence, there was no Equal Protection viola-
tion. IM at 489.
72. Id at 490.
73. Id at 488 (citing Schneider v. Indian River Community College Found., Inc., 875 F.2d
1537, 1541 (1 th Cir. 1989)).
74. Id
75. Id
76. Chandler. 917 F.2d at 488.
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tent of GPTC's programming to best serve the public's interest."
Further, the court reasoned that the decision to air any show is nec-
essarily content-based, 78 and GPTC clearly had regulated content by
making an editorial decision to air the debates between the two major
parties. 9 Contrary to the district court's holding, however, the Eleventh
Circuit characterized GPTC's actions as "reasonable" and found that
GPTC's decision promoted its function. 0 Therefore, the court of ap-
peals held that although GPTC's decision to limit the debates to the
Democratic and Republican candidates was content-based, it was "not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's views. "81 The court contended: "Our view does not mandate
[or] authorize... state thought control through selective airing of view-
points on public television stations. Without deciding, we can safely pre-
dict that the use of state instrumentalities to suppress unwanted
expressions in the marketplace of ideas would authorize judicial interven-
tion to vindicate the First Amendment."8 2 The court concluded that the
district court had erred in basing its order on First Amendment grounds,
because the selection of the candidates who would participate in the tele-
vised debates was not viewpoint-restrictive and did not advance a consti-
tutionally impermissible, discriminatory bias in the station's mission.
83
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Clark declared that the First Amendment for-
bids the state from "selectively choosing which qualified candidates can
and cannot debate," 4 and prohibits the state from refusing its citizens
the chance to concurrently view all of the candidates whose names will
appear on the ballot.8 He explained that the resolution of the case re-
volved around the typology of forums developed for First Amendment
77. Id. (citing Schneider v. Indian River Community College Found., Inc., 875 F.2d 1537,
1541 (11th Cir. 1989)).
78. Id at 489.
79. Id
80. Id
81. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
82. Id
83. Id The court also reasoned that the Libertarian candidates did not demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, so the grant of preliminary injunctive relief was
an abuse of the district court's discretion and injunctive relief should be denied. Id at 490.
The standard of review regarding a district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief is
abuse of discretion. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11 th Cir. 1983).
84. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 490(l1th Cir.
1990).
85. Id.
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analysis.86 Judge Clark concluded that the government of Georgia had
created, at a minimum, a nonpublic forum87 because the general public
was not invited to appear on GPTC's network and there was no evidence
of governmental intent to designate a public forum.88
Further, Judge Clark pointed out that the main issue in the case was
the Libertarians' First Amendment right to express their viewpoints, not
GPTC's prerogative to maintain control over its programming content.8 9
Judge Clark argued that the content of GPTC's broadcasts of the two
debates had already been determined; it was to be the political contention
for the offices of lieutenant-governor and governor of Georgia. There-
fore, GPTC could not dictate the particular message the contenders
would communicate.'* According to Judge Clark, GPTC's decision to
exclude Chandler and Rand was not viewpoint-neutral and should have
been held unconstitutional. Judge Clark would have affirmed the lower
court:91 "[B]y discriminating against the viewpoints expressed by the
Libertarians, GPTC has violated even the minimal First Amendment
standards applicable to nonpublic forums."92
Additionally, Judge Clark explained that the exclusion of particular
candidates not only put a stamp of approval on the favored candidates
but also curtailed access to ideas. As a result, GPTC prevented the dis-
semination of information to the public by precluding the public's view-
ing of the interaction between debating candidates.93 Judge Clark
asserted that if lines had to be drawn, qualification for the ballot was a
justified line allowing access to the debates.94
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Exceeds the Bounds of the First
Amendment
1. Imposition of a Viewpoint-Based Restriction
The decision of the Georgia Public Telecommunications Commis-
sion, which the court of appeals approved, clearly discriminated against
the viewpoints of the Libertarian candidates. GPTC is "an instrumental-
86. Id at 491.
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 493.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id at 491.
93. Id at 493-94.
94. Chandler. 917 F.2d at 494.
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ity of the State of Georgia and a public corporation."9 5 As such, it has
the power to "act as agent for the United States of America, or any
agency, department, corporation, or instrumentality thereof, in any man-
ner within the purposes or powers of the commission."9 6 Yet GPTC,
functioning as an arm of the State of Georgia and its government, cannot
discriminately choose which qualified candidates may be allowed to con-
vey their views. As Judge Clark indicated in his dissent,9 7 GPTC's ac-
tions were not viewpoint-neutral; GPTC prohibited the views of
Chandler and Rand from being aired, based on their minor party
affiliation.
It is a matter of law that individual members of the public do not
have a right to broadcast their own particular views on any matter,98 and
individuals cannot compel a television station to air their views, no mat-
ter how true and important they may be.9 9 Instead, Congress has chosen
to protect the public's First Amendment rights in broadcasting "by rely-
ing on broadcasters as public trustees, periodically accountable for their
stewardship, to use their discretion in ensuring the public's access to con-
flicting ideas." 1° In Chandler and Rand's case, however, GPTC failed
to exercise sound discretion when it chose to air political debates between
only the Democratic and Republican candidates. Its disparate treatment
of the Libertarians constituted unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrim-
ination. GPTC clearly stated that it had excluded Chandler and Rand
from the televised debates because the ideas and information communi-
cated by minor party candidates would be of less interest and benefit to
the Georgia citizens. 1 ' Further, the director of GPTC, who is a state
employee, 10 2 explicitly asserted that the viewpoints of the Libertarians
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-1(a) (Michie 1991).
96. IM § 20-13-11(8).
97. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
98. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 112-13
(1973).
99. See, eg., FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 380-81 (1984);
Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Amid v. WUSA TV-Channel Nine, 751
F. Supp. 211, 212 (D.D.C. 1990).
100. Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
101. The district court pointed out that GPTC had stated:
Were its air waves open for unrestricted access to all citizens, the GPTC would be
unable to operate within the guidelines set by Congress through enactment of the
Federal Communications Act .... GPTC clearly has as its legitimate purpose the
dissemination of newsworthy information in a format it judges to be responsive to the
demands of the public. The citizens of Georgia will, in large measure, vote for either
the Democratic or Republican candidates in the upcoming elections.
Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 749 F. Supp. 264, 267-68 (N.D. Ga.
1990).
102. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-10(a) (Michie 1991).
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were less valuable than those of the Democrats and Republicans.10 3 The
result was that GPTC seriously thwarted Georgia citizens' access to con-
flicting ideas among all the candidates who would appear on the ballot.
Contrary to GPTC's opinion that the views of minor party candi-
dates are of little benefit, minor party candidates have the potential to
win elective office or substantially impact the outcome of an election.' 4
Even if the major party candidates attract more attention and have a
greater chance of election by the community, suppression of the view-
points of minor party candidates violates the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom of speech. This type of discrimination violates "a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment... that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable."10 5
As a United States agent, GPTC is authorized to receive funding
from the State of Georgia, the United States of America, or any agency,
political subdivision, or instrumentality thereof. 6 In effect, the Chan-
dler decision allows the government, via GPTC, to use taxpayers' money
and public facilities to endorse the views of the two majority parties and
dictate what the public will view. The government's actions, which were
sanctioned by a United States appellate court, exhibit an intolerance for
views that are not as widely accepted by the general public. The exclu-
sion of minor party candidates and their ideas from political discussions
not only reinforces the two-party mold among the American people, but
also benefits national, state and local government in an extremely self-
serving way. This encouragement of only two parties is especially appar-
ent in Georgia, where the state government is composed entirely of Dem-
ocratic and Republican officials."17
Finally, it was not necessary for the district court and court of ap-
103. Chandler, 749 F. Supp. at 268. See also Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunica-
tions Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 491-92 (1 1th Cir. 1990). In his dissent, Judge Clark noted that
the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held by the district court was replete with statements
by the executive director that GPTC decided the viewpoints of the Libertarians were less valu-
able. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 491-92. For example: "I think... that the value of the program
was that only these two sets of views would be expressed, one contrasted with the other, be-
cause, again, they are the frontrunners for which the majority of the people, in all likelihood,
will vote." Iii at 492.
104. Sea e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35 (1975).
105. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
106. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-13-5(b), 20-13-11(6) (Michie 1991).
107. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND THE
LEGISLATURES 1991-92 25-28 (1991). See also Raphael, supra note 1, at 742 ("Minor parties
in this century have been of fleeting importance politically and have often represented unpopu-
lar causes. The experience and orientation of those in Congress and on the Court have been
toward a two-party system.").
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peals to consider the type of forum created by the Georgia state govern-
ment or determine whether a reasonable basis existed for the exclusion of
the Libertarian candidates. The courts need not have reached these is-
sues because GPTC forbade the broadcast of the third party candidates'
less popular views, and thereby failed to meet the threshold standards
required for both content-based and content-neutral restrictions.1 08 In-
deed, any regulation based upon an individual's views is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the First Amendment." 9 The First Amendment
prohibits such viewpoint-based discrimination even in nonpublic forums,
where the government is given the greatest latitude to regulate.'
Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum and are viewpoint neutral .... [A] speaker may be ex-
cluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic
not encompassed within the purpose of the forum... or if he is
not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial [sic]
benefit the forum was created, ... [but] the government violates
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely
to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise in-
cludible subject."'
2. A Compelling Governmental Interest Does Not Exist to Justify
the Chandler Decision
Even if the exclusion of the Libertarians was not viewpoint-based,
the court's regulation of speech based on content was unjustified. Free-
dom of speech is a fundamental right, and Chandler's and Rand's speech
undoubtedly fell within that classification of expression that is granted
the greatest constitutional protection--core political speech." 2 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that its decision to pre-
clude Chandler and Rand from entering the debates was content-
108. See supra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
11. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citations omitted).
See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) ("[A
third category consists of] [plublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication .... [T]he State may reserve [such property] for its intended pur-
poses, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.").
112. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988).
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based,"'3 yet it concluded that the decision was "reasonable" and consis-
tent with the First Amendment, considering GPTC's function to educate
and serve the public. 14
The United States Supreme Court has defined core political speech
as "interactive communication concerning political change."' 5 It has
asserted that such speech shall receive "First Amendment protections...
'at its zenith.' ,116 Unlike governmental regulation of categories of
speech that have been accorded "low" First Amendment value and are
only marginally protected,"1 7 regulation of core political speech is "sub-
ject to exacting scrutiny.""' 8 Debates between candidates in a political
campaign exemplify expression within the Supreme Court's definition of
core political speech. Thus, contrary to the court of appeals' holding, the
government may not restrict such speech based on its content or the
message conveyed unless the regulation is necessary to achieve a compel-
ling governmental purpose.'1 9 In the Chandler case,
no more telling example of "interactive communication con-
cerning political change" can be imagined than debates be-
tween candidates for political office held only a few days before
the elections. [Chandler's and Rand's] speech is clearly core
political speech, and any restrictions on that speech must be
subjected to the strictest constitutional review. 20
The regulation imposed by GPTC is unnecessary, if not directly an-
tithetical, to accomplishing the objective of providing a program of edu-
cational value. Inclusion of all of the ballot-qualified candidates, in
addition to the Democratic and Republican candidates, would likely
have increased the program's educational worth.' Further, the pro-
grammers' stated goal in airing the debate between the two "frontrun-
ners"-to provide an educational program of sufficient interest to attract
113. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 489 (11 th Cir.
1990).
114. Id
115. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
116. Id. at 425 (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 1987)).
117. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
118. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420.
119. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45,
53-54 (1982) ("[W]hen a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the
voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by
not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate with-
out unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.").
120. Walker L. Chandler and Carole Ann Rand, Petitioners, Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 5, Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
121. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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viewers12 2-- hardly seems to constitute a sufficiently compelling purpose
to override the constitutional prohibition of content-based regulation of
speech. In contrast, the need to assure individual liberty and the unfet-
tered exchange of ideas to bring about political and social changes is of
utmost significance. 123 Under general First Amendment standards, these
fundamental interests far outweigh the need to exclude duly qualified
candidates in the interests of programming and journalistic discretion.
In demarcating the powers and obligations of the state and federal gov-
ernments, the fundamental right to freedom of speech cannot succumb to
inadequately justified governmental desires.
B. Chandler Does Not Reflect Sound Policy
1. The Fundamental Rationales of Free Expression Do Not Justify
the Court of Appeals' Holding
Not only does the Chandler court's holding impose an impermissi-
ble viewpoint-based or content-based restriction on expression, but the
court's ruling also runs counter to the underlying principles of the First
Amendment. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit's holding was unconstitutional.
a. The Self-Governance Rationale
Courts and commentators have justified the protection of speech
under the Constitution by focusing primarily on the rationales of "self-
governance" and a "marketplace of ideas." 124 The self-governance the-
ory is grounded upon the concept that free expression facilitates self-gov-
ernment and is necessary to ensure a democratic system.2" Free men
govern themselves, 26 and thus, need to be informed of the occurrences in
their communities in order to hold their government-ultimately them-
selves-accountable. 127 The people of a democracy must be afforded the
opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss and decide matters of public
122. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489.
123. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)).
124. See, e.g. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1017-24 (2d ed. 1991);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-89 (2d ed. 1988); CHESTER J.
ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GOVERNMENT 4
(1969).
125. See, eg., TRIBE, supra note 124, at 786-87; WALTER GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS:
THE CONSTITIUION IN ACTION 41-45 (1960).
126. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 16 (1948).
127. GELLHORN, supra note 125, at 42.
FIRST AMENDMENT
policy. 128
In Chandler, the Eleventh Circuit's decision unconstitutionally
abridged Chandler's and Rand's freedom of public discussion. As a re-
sult, the Georgia electorate was deprived of the opportunity to fully exer-
cise its democratic powers. GPTC's exclusion of the Libertarians
curtailed the two candidates' participation in political discussion as well
as obstructed the Georgia citizenry's access to a complete interchange of
political ideas-between all of the candidates who would appear on the
ballot. Because of the vital role television plays in informing and educat-
ing the public, 29 GPTC's actions significantly and impermissibly frus-
trated the electorate's ability to make responsible, enlightened decisions
about issues forming the bases of its government.
b. The Marketplace of Ideas Rationale
The marketplace of ideas theory rests on the premise that "the ulti-
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out."' 3° In fact, our society relies on
the presumption that exposure of thoughts to the marketplace of ideas
tests the worth of proposals leading to adoption of meritorious ideas and
abandonment of irrational theories.
1 31
The Chandler court's holding, however, was directly converse to the
marketplace of ideas rationale. Instead of enhancing the public's discov-
ery of truth, the Eleventh Circuit effectively limited the Georgia citizens'
exposure to competing ideas. The Libertarians were not provided the
opportunity to simultaneously express their views in competition with
those of the Democrats and Republicans. Thus, by silencing the opinions
of Chandler and Rand, the Eleventh Circuit robbed the Georgia electo-
rate of the opportunity to freely discover and evaluate the most desirable
ideas from among the entire marketplace of gubernatorial candidates.
c. The Rationale of Fear of Government Censorship
Among the other notable justifications suggested for protecting free
128. Id See also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. LJ. 1, 20-35 (1971).
129. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
130. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
131. Aimnmu, supra note 124, at 4. See also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), in which Judge Learned Hand said: "[R]ight conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative
selection."
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expression is the rationale based upon fear of government censorship.
This theory arises from the desire to preclude the government from de-
ciding what should be stated 132 and to prevent the mere threat of regula-
tion from having a censorial or "chilling" effect on expression. 133 One
famous legal scholar has noted that, "[i]f we advert to the nature of Re-
publican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the
people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people."
134
Despite this national policy of promoting free expression within our
republican system absent government restraint of ideas, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in effect, endorsed government censorship of what the public could
view. The Chandler court failed to serve the community's need to have
open vehicles through which individuals could express their thoughts,
and the court did not rely on the democratic process to ensure that the
most meaningful ideas would emerge from the debates. Rather, by per-
mitting only the two major party candidates to participate in the debates,
the Eleventh Circuit granted GPTC the authority to determine for the
electorate which ideas were right or wrong.
d. The Checking Value Rationale
A "checking value" theory, which focuses upon the value of free
speech in checking the abuse of power by public officials, has also been
advanced to justify broad protection of free speech.'35 "The check on
government must come from the power of public opinion .... [T]he role
of the ordinary citizen is... to retain a veto power to be employed when
the decisions of officials pass certain bounds."
' 1 36
Since our system of government is based on the premise of govern-
132. See, eg., James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Out-
comes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 892, 893 (1984); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
In the context of Government control over the content of broadcast discussions of issues
of public interest, courts and Congress have been hesitant to acknowledge an unlimited right of
interference by the government in the affairs of broadcasters. See Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d
157, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
133. Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938) (Ordinance prohibiting the distribu-
tion of circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind without first obtaining writ-
ten permission from the City Manager "strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the
press by subjecting it to license and censorship .... Legislation of the type of the ordinance in
question would restore the system of license and censorship in its baldest form.").
134. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (quoting 4 ANNALS OF
CONG. 934 (1794)).
135. STONE et al., supra note 124, at 1022-23.
136. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 539, 542 (1977).
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ment by the people, it follows that the electorate must have access to
pertinent information to use in its decision-making process and to hold
elected officials accountable.' In Chandler, however, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stripped the Georgia citizenry of its right to witness the exchange of
ideas from among all of the individuals who could potentially serve as its
gubernatorial officials. The court's conclusion that GPTC permissibly
could include in the broadcast debates candidates from only the major
government parties-Democrats and Republicans-limited the citizens'
availability of information impacting their community and their ability
to provide a check on local government officials. In lieu of a policy of
government by the people, the Eleventh Circuit authorized a system of
government by the (GPTC) government officials, and the electorate was
rendered powerless to veto this decision.
e. The Free Expression Rationales as Applied to Political Speech
Political speech goes to the heart of the Constitution.1 31 It embodies
basic values of the First Amendment, providing a means by which citi-
zens can: (1) make informed decisions regarding public policy and the
role of government; (2) test their ideas amongst others; (3) freely express
their views on issues with no risk of censorship; and (4) check the actions
of their government. Therefore, political speech should be ascribed the
greatest security. 39 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that "ex-
pression on public issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.' ,,4 By holding that GPTC can
constitutionally prohibit individuals from expressing their views in a
137. Gregory A. Paw, Political Broadcasting Access in the United States and Great Britain,
10 COMM. & L. 27, 32 (1988).
138. See, e-g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). In Williams, the Supreme Court
explained: 'There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monop-
oly on the right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmen-
tal policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms." Id
at 32.
See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966):
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there
is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discus-
sions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which gov-
ernment is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political
processes.
139. See, eg., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Chief Justice Hughes, speaking
for the Court, stressed that "the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people... an opportunity essen-
tial to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."
Id at 369.
140. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citation omitted).
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political debate, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals cut off a
vital channel of communication to the citizens of Georgia and inhibited
the fundamental First Amendment rights of minor party candidates.
Because the ideas of the Libertarian candidates were representative
of an organized political group, they were of collective import and should
have been incorporated into the broadcast political debates. Although a
broadcast medium is not constitutionally obligated to cater to individu-
als' demands of self-expression, 4 1 the interest in self-expression becomes
a collective one rather than an individual concern when members of an
identifiable group share certain views or beliefs that they desire to com-
municate to the populace.' 42 The focus shifts from an individual need to
express oneself to the opportunity- for representatives of an identifiable
group to convey commonly shared beliefs and be heard.14 3
As Alexander Meiklejohn explained:
The First Amendment... is not the guardian of unregulated
talkativeness. It does not require that, on every occasion, every
citizen shall take part in public debate. Nor can it even give
assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to do so...
What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said.'"
When the identifiable group is political in nature, the opportunity
for expression is of even greater salience. Because political viewpoint di-
versity is essential to democratic self-government, 14 5 and political parties
are indispensable features of democracy,'"' access to a wide diversity of
views in the political arena benefits all members of the listening and view-
ing audience. 47 Allowing the viewpoints of minority party candidates to
be aired is also consistent with the fundamental principles of the First
Amendment. 4 ' Viewers then have the opportunity to evaluate, adopt
and reject particular views from amongst the "marketplace" of political
ideas, and they can use this exposure to competing views as a basis for
deciding how they wish to be governed and what policies should control.
One scholar has written: "For mature deliberation of an issue by
141. Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Cross-
roads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583, 621 (1991).
142. See. eg., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3020 (1990).
143. Rosenfeld, supra note 141, at 621.
144. MEIKLEjOHN, supra note 126, at 26.
145. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
146. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 430 (4th
ed. 1968).
147. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3011 (1990).
148. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
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any number of people who are to act collectively presupposes an ex-
change of views on the issues involved in the decision. If that opportu-
nity is not available, nothing can be decided." 49 Consequently, since
representatives of political groups have a legitimate interest in expression
and society has an interest in encouraging such communication, freedom
of speech might correspondingly be described as freedom to hear. 50
This right to hear and to be heard should not be dependent upon repre-
sentatives' political party affiliations.
2. The Role of Public Television Differs from That of Private
Commercial Broadcasting
Unlike private programming, which is based on competition and the
demands of the market, public programming provides a forum for infor-
mation that could not survive in the competitive commercial market or
"pay its own way" on private television. 1 t As a public broadcaster,
GPTC was specifically "created, designed, and intended for the purpose
of providing educational, instructional, and public broadcasting services
to the citizens of the State of Georgia... ."I52 In Chandler, the court of
appeals explained that GPTC chose to air a debate between only the
Democratic and Republican candidates because "it believed such a de-
bate would be of the most interest and benefit to the citizens of Geor-
gia."' 153 It noted that "[s]uch a decision promoted GPTC's function."' 5 4
Contrary to the court's opinion, however, GPTC's exclusionary ac-
tions did not advance the goal of providing educational, instructional and
public broadcasting services. Although the codified responsibilities of
GPTC dictated that the views of the Libertarians be aired, GPTC did
just the opposite. It barred the participation of the third party candi-
dates in the political debate, thus depriving the public of the opportunity
to consider all of the different views and make an informed decision. In-
deed, in any given political campaign, it is difficult to believe that only
two different positions exist on any given issue. Simplifying views into
two party platforms (Democratic and Republican) and leaving voters
149. FRIEDRICH, supra note 146, at 131.
150. ANTIEAU, supra note 124, at 4.
151. See e.g., Cris T. Kako, Comment, The Right of "Reasonable Access"for Federal Polit-
ical Candidates Under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Ac4 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1287,
1300 (1978) ("Noncommercial stations serve a special broadcasting function by furnishing ed-
ucational, cultural, and public interest programming that commercial licensees find economi-
cally impracticable to present."); Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Comm'n, 917
F.2d 486, 492 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
152. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-5(a) (Michie 1991).
153. Chandler, 917 F.2d at 489.
154. Id
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with only two candidates from which to choose does not seem to justly
represent the diversity of views in society.
Further, the court's decision not only curtailed access to ideas, but
also denied citizens the opportunity to simultaneously view and compare
the candidates whose names would appear on the ballot. The Libertarian
candidates were each offered one-half hour of air time to express their
views. This time period, however, was separate from the debates. The
executive director of GPTC even admitted that the audience during such
a time would be substantially smaller than the audience during the de-
bate.' 5 Consequently, the Libertarians' views would receive less expo-
sure among the citizens of Georgia. Additionally, the exclusion of minor
party candidates deprived the Georgia community of the chance to ob-
serve concurrently the interchange of divergent points of view during the
debates. Hence, the educational and instructional content of the commu-
nication that was aired provided limited value.
VI. IMPLICATIONS: INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF MINOR PARTY
CANDIDATES IN FUTURE TELEVISED DEBATES?
The 1990 decision in Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunica-
tions Commission has been codified in the Official Code of Georgia,
which states:
EXCLUDING MINORITY CANDIDATE FROM POLIT-
ICAL DEBATE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
-Commission's decision to air a debate between Democrat and
Republican candidates for governor, while excluding a Liberta-
rian candidate, was not viewpoint restrictive and did not lack a
rational basis and therefore did not violate the first amendment
or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'5 6
This codification, coupled with the ruling of the court, serves as a
foundation to which courts in the State of Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and even the United States Supreme Court, can refer
in the future. The ramifications of the Chandler decision are unthink-
able. The suppression of a duly qualified candidate's speech in a televised
political debate has been deemed an acceptable, constitutional activity
that others can now duplicate.
A. Distinctions Based Exclusively on Party Affiliation
By limiting the debate aired by a public broadcaster to the Demo-
155. Id. at 493.
156. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-13-5, Judicial Decisions (Michie 1991).
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cratic and Republican candidates, the government is, in actuality, giving
its seal of approval solely to the two parties and their views. This prac-
tice ensures that only persons from these parties will ever hold positions
in office. It runs counter to the Supreme Court's declaration that "the
primary values protected by the First Amendment... are served when
election campaigns are not monopolized by existing political parties." 5 '
This apparent favoritism epitomizes government monopoly over the
political process. The Georgia state government seems to be saying,
"Since there are two major government parties and we have control over
the television station, we can arbitrarily exclude the minor parties and
favor the Democrats and Republicans." Thus, candidates can now be
distinguished solely on the basis of their party affiliation and the views
they represent. Majority rule in the free speech forum can be used to
suppress minority views, and candidates can be excluded from taking
part in important political discussions regardless of the fact that their
party affiliations are irrelevant to their ability to participate intelligently
in the electoral process.
B. Unanswered Questions
The Chandler decision not only imposes on society the majoritarian
points of view to the detriment of third parties, but it also leaves open
many unanswered questions. These questions include the following: (1)
Will the exclusion of third party candidates from televised political de-
bates be extended to other media, such as public television and radio in
states other than Georgia?; (2) Can this government dominion over the
political process stretch into other components of elections, such as polit-
ical advertisements?; (3) Would the type of election involved, for exam-
ple, party convention or primary elections, play a part in the decision?;
and (4) If a public broadcaster were obligated to air the views of third
party candidates, where should it draw the line? In other words, should
access to debates be available for all candidates, including write-in candi-
dates, or only to those who are ballot-qualified?
The holding in Chandler-permitting a public broadcaster to ex-
clude minor party candidates from participating in political speech-
could easily be expanded to apply to any type of public, government-
controlled broadcast, even one remotely connected to the expression of
political ideas. For example, Chandler could be interpreted as allowing
the government to regulate which candidates may participate or be men-
tioned in political advertisements, commercials, question-and-answer
157. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983).
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symposia or commentaries appearing on any public television or radio
station. The reach of the Chandler court's ruling could also include com-
munications associated with any type of political election, such as party
conventions, primary elections, and elections for local, state and national
offices. Government censorship of political speech and control over po-
tential speakers could become virtually all-encompassing.
C. An Alternative Approach
It is conceivable that if public broadcasters were required to air the
views of all minor party candidates, freedom of expression would be fur-
ther repressed and not enhanced. Television and radio stations may opt
not to air debates out of fear of excluding a candidate and being subject
to sanctions and negative publicity. Moreover, a requirement to air the
views of all candidates could be time-consuming and interfere with pub-
lic broadcasters' programming; it may act as a harness on public televi-
sion and subsequently limit society's exposure to a diversity of views.
The media may prefer to eliminate any in-depth, investigative reporting
of political candidates and their views or to give only superficial treat-
ment to individuals' candidacy. Additionally, broadcasters might choose
to avoid discussion of public issues in their programming altogether.
Yet, rather than speculating on the future scope of Chandler and
answering remaining open questions on a case-by-case basis, a line must
be drawn so that the fate of third party candidates is not left to the whim
of the judicial system. To assure the uninhibited presentation of con-
trasting viewpoints and controversial public issues without significant
burdens on public airways, a line could be drawn to allow only those
candidates with a certain percentage of votes to have air time. This per-
centage might be based on the required number of votes necessary to
become qualified for the ballot according to the applicable federal or state
law. In this manner, all candidates who have displayed a serious interest
in candidacy would be permitted to participate in the political in-
terchange. As an alternative, individuals could be required to obtain a
certain percentage of voters to sign a petition for their candidacy. Re-
gardless of which method is utilized, neither proposal leaves room for a
court to levy its subjective opinion on an issue of such great import.
VII. CONCLUSION
The power of the broadcast medium---especially in the context of
political elections' --- combined with the fact that GPTC is a govern-
158. See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
FIRST AMENDMENT
ment instrumentality and the fact that political speech was the type of
expression at issue in Chandler, all dictated that GPTC's exclusionary
actions were unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit's endorsement of
the broadcaster's actions was inimical to the First Amendment, which
was founded on the belief that some types of speech are invaluable.' 59
Aside from the few narrowly-defined classes of unprotected or margin-
ally protected expression,"W the courts have recognized a need for
speech, counterspeech and competing points of view. The advancement
of speech is especially important in the areas of politics and public inter-
est; the electorate and democracy benefit by increased accessibility to in-
formation and diverse viewpoints. 6 ' The media play a crucial role in
bringing these ideas and messages to citizens and educating the public to
perform the duties of the electorate.'
62
In maintaining public broadcasting stations, the government is en-
gaged in the business of communicating to the citizenry. After Chandler,
the government is permitted to bifurcate political issues into those repre-
senting the majority parties, the Democrats and Republicans, and those
of the minority parties. Any views affiliated with a minor party may be
suppressed. If this results, however, could the government justly say that
the candidates participating in a debate on public television represent the
voices of the people? The very essence of the First Amendment is that all
individuals have been granted the right to express themselves freely.1
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The State should not possess the ultimate power to determine arbitrarily
which views the public should hear in a political debate and what polit-
ical exposure best serves the public interest. If such control were toler-
ated, government would seriously impair individuals' right to free
159. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In discussing the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, the Court noted that the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations
operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities: "Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution." Id. at 14.
160. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
161. See, eg. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976)
("First Amendment protection of the right to know has frequently been recognized in the
past."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc. 425 U.S.
748, 756-57 (1976).
162. See Paw, supra note 137, at 27. See also Rosenfeld, supra note 141, at 623 ("Broad-
casting is but one of many different fora suited for self-expression and the dissemination of
viewpoints. Because of its capacity to reach a mass audience, however, broadcasting assumes a
position of special importance in achieving these ideals.").
163. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized "the inherent value of free discourse."
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) ("The values
enshrined in the First Amendment plainly rank high 'in the scale of our national values.' ").
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speech. The significance of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of expression, whether explained in terms of a self-governance, market-
place of ideas, fear of government censorship or checking value theory,'"
would be significantly undermined. A neutral, administrable boundary
must be imposed, such as qualification for the ballot, to prevent the views
of the majority from quashing the expression of those in the minority.
The power of the government to fortify one type of view-in this case,
the popular platforms espoused by the Democrats and Republicans-
must not transform into the authority to stamp out another.
s16
Debra L. Klevatt
164. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978):
"[lhe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment .... " Moreover, the people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.
Id. at 790-91 (citation omitted).
